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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider, for a moment, a case involving a seventy-one-year-old
defendant who has no prior convictions and turned himself in before the
authorities had any inkling of his criminal conduct. He agreed quickly to
plead guilty to all charges filed by the government, and none of the
offenses involved violence or physical threats. He cooperated with the
authorities by explaining his misconduct and turned over assets tied to
his crimes. There was virtually no chance he would be trusted again, so
there is no likelihood of recidivism; nor did he pose any future physical
danger to society. Prior to disclosing his crimes, he was a well-respected
figure on Wall Street who had a history of charitable acts along with
providing generous benefits to his employees. This sounds quite a bit like
the usual white-collar defendant who would be an unlikely candidate for
a significant prison term-unless that defendant is Bernie Madoff.
Of course, Madoff is not the typical white-collar criminal, although
he bears a surface resemblance to others convicted of crimes involving
fraud. At his sentencing hearing, Madoff's own lawyer described him as
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
The author appreciates the comments and suggestions of Judge Avem Cohn,
Miriam Baer, Brandon Garrett, and his colleagues on the Wayne Law faculty.
1. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 732-33 (2007) ("The corporate white collar offenders of today are
typically individuals who have never been convicted of criminal conduct and are now
facing incredibly long sentences as first offenders.").
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"deeply flawed," a point affirmed by the many victims who provided
letters and testimony about the devastation he caused while personally
assuring the security of their investment.2 His wife said she felt "betrayed
and confused. The man who committed this horrible fraud is not the man
whom I have known for all these years."3 The federal probation office
recommended a sentence of fifty years,4 effectively a term of life
imprisonment for a seventy-one-year-old man.
But when Judge Denny Chin went even higher by imposing a 150-
year sentence, the maximum allowable punishment, he spoke of its
symbolic effect as reflecting retribution for the violations. 5 He said that a
"message must be sent that Mr. Madoff's crimes were extraordinarily
evil, and that this kind of irresponsible manipulation of the system is not
merely a bloodless financial crime that takes place just on paper, but that
it is instead.., one that takes a staggering human toll."'6 The judge went
on to address a second consideration, however, discussing the deterrent
effect of such a significant prison term.7 Judge Chin pointed out that "the
symbolism is important here because the strongest possible message
must be sent to those who would engage in similar conduct that they will
be caught and that they will be punished to the fullest extent of the law."
8
There exists virtually no published criticism of the Madoff sentence,
even from those who decry the lengthy incarcerations imposed on
defendants convicted of drug dealing and child pornography. A news
article about reforming sentences for white-collar crimes went out of its
way to distance itself from Madoff and corporate executives convicted of
wrongdoing, stating that "[n]o one is seeking leniency for imprisoned
financier Bernie Madoff, who's serving a 150-year sentence for bilking
2. Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?pagewanted=all.
3. Ruth Madoff Finally Breaks Her Silence, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 29, 2009,
1:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/ruth-madoff-finally-breaks-her-
silence/?ref=business.
4. Tom Hays, Bernie Madoff Gets Maximum 150 Years in Prison, MASS LYE (June
29, 2009),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/06/bemiemadoff gets maximum_! 50.ht
ml.
5. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 47, United States v. Madoff, (No. 09-CR-213)
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090629sentencingtranscriptcorrected.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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thousands of people of nearly $20 billion, or fallen corporate titans
whose greed drove their companies into the ground." 9
Who did Judge Chin intend to receive this message of deterrence-
other Ponzi scheme perpetrators, and perhaps the Wall Street executives
and so-called sophisticated investors who once viewed Madoff as an
innovator in the stock market who was worthy of their respect? By their
nature, those who consider themselves well-versed in the ways of Wall
Street are unlikely to think that they would ever be in a situation like
Bernie Madoff, being convicted for substantial criminal charges and
facing a federal judge for sentencing. Similarly, scam artists presumably
will not pause to consider a potential life sentence for their misconduct as
they seek to bilk others. Thus, the deterrent effect of the 150-year prison
term may never be felt by its intended targets.
If the evilness of Madoff's scheme justifies the exorbitant prison
sentence he received, then notions of deterrence would seem to be
irrelevant when a crime like his causes such significant harm. Casually
referring to the goal of deterring others did not seem to have an
appreciable impact on the ultimate punishment, but it does hint that
others should not dare to engage in a multi-year, multi-billion dollar
Ponzi scheme-a warning to which no one will pay any heed.
One can argue that the crimes of Bernie Madoff were sui generis, so
his sentencing does not contribute to our understanding of the role of
deterrence in punishing white-collar offenders. So, consider the case of
another defendant, Ty Warner, the billionaire owner of Ty, Inc.-the
company that makes "Beanie Babies," fueling a brief craze in the late
1990s that led collectors to pay hundreds of dollars for droll plush toys
with little inherent value.10 In 2013, Warner pleaded guilty to hiding a
Swiss bank account for a number of years that, at its peak, held about
$100 million, evading about $5.5 million in taxes on its earnings." He
paid the back taxes, plus a penalty, in a civil settlement with the Internal
Revenue Service. Rejecting the government's recommendation that the
court impose a prison sentence of at least some modest length for the tax
9. Eric Tucker, Sentencing Changes Sought for Business Crimes, DAILY NEWS (Aug.
13, 2014), http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2014/aug/14/sentencing-changes-
sought-for-business-crimes.
10. See Bryan Smith, Behind the Beanie Babies: The Secret Life of Ty Warner,
CHICAGO (Apr. 12, 2014, 10:25 AM). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Do We Need A
"Beanie Baby " Fraud Statute?, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1031 (2000).
11. See David Voreacos & Andrew M. Harris, Beanie Baby Maker Ty Warner Tax
Sentence Appealed by U.S., BLOOMBERG Bus. (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:04 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articies/2014-02-13/beanie-baby-maker-ty-wamer-tax-
sentence-appealed-by-u-s-.
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violation, Judge Charles Kocoras instead opted for only probation. 12
During the sentencing hearing, the judge said that he was persuaded by a
number of letters submitted on the defendant's behalf in finding that
"Mr. Warner's private acts of kindness, generosity and benevolence are
overwhelming. Never have I had a defendant in any case-white-collar
crime or otherwise-demonstrate the level of humanity and concern for
the welfare of others as has Mr. Warner."'
13
Judge Kocoras discounted the deterrent effect a prison sentence
might have on others, noting that Warner's case was "highly-publicized"
and "the public humiliation and reproachment Mr. Warner has
experienced is manifest. Only he knows the private torment he has
suffered by the public condemnation directed at him.' 4 In imposing a
two-year term of probation and 500 hours of community service, along
with a $100,000 fine, Judge Kocoras said, "One of the considerations for
me is whether society would be better off with Mr. Warner in jail or
whether it would be best served by utilizing his talents and beneficience
[sic] to help make this a better world."' 15
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the probationary sentence, finding that
"[w]hile incarcerating Warner undoubtedly would have sent a stronger
message, the message sent by his existing sentence is, in our view, strong
enough ...., The circuit court tried to avoid the impression that the
sentence meant that white-collar criminals will receive lighter
punishment when they make a good impression, asserting that "other,
more typical defendants should take no comfort in the fact that Warner
avoided punishment."' 7 Of course, that's exactly what other defendants
will do by proclaiming how close they are to a defendant like Warner,
and how far away from the likes of a Bernie Madoff they are. Justifying
a sentence as a one-off circumstance does not work very well in a system
12. Id.
13. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 50-51, United States v. Warner, (No. 13 CR
731) (N.D. I11. Jan. 14, 2014), copy on file with Wayne Law Review. The Judge noted that
in looking at Mr. Warner's charitable contributions, he "did things that I am not aware
anyone else does. Certainly, not anyone before me. And it would be unjust for me to
ignore that, not measure it and say, in the end, that trumps all of the ill-will and
misconduct he engaged in." Id. at 52.
14. Id. at 50.
15. Id. at 51. The Department of Justice filed an appeal of the sentence imposed on
Warner. Matthew D. Lee, Justice Department Files Appeal Brief in Beanie Babies Case,
TAX CONTROVERSY WATCH (May 21, 2014),
http://taxcontroversywatch.com/2014/05/2l /justice-department-files-appeal-brief-in-
beanie-babies-case/.
16. United States v. Warner, No. 14-1330, 2015 WL 4153651, at *12 (7th Cir. July
10, 2015).
17. Id. at*13.
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that relies on precedents for guidance and tries to treat like defendants
alike.
Was the sentencing of Bernie Madoff too harsh? Was the
punishment of Ty Warner too light? It is difficult to criticize Madoff's
punishment when the harm suffered by the victims was so devastating,
and yet 150 years was a largely meaningless gesture when a prison term
of thirty or fourty years would have the same effect by condemning him
to spend the rest of his life behind bars. Thus, the symbolism Judge Chin
referred to is not so much about general deterrence as it is about the need
for retribution: society's interest in punishment is vindicated by such a
prison term, even if its length has no additional impact on the defendant.
In contrast, did the punishment of Warner reflect a balanced view of a
wealthy individual whose otherwise exemplary life was marred by
engaging in just a single instance of misconduct, albeit one that lasted
over a decade? Or did his sentence send the message that the wealthy can
receive a lighter punishment so long as they are reasonably generous and
generate a measure of public goodwill that can be tapped if necessary?
The answer is that the law tells us precious little about what is an
appropriate sentence, especially for a white-collar offender.
One of the primary justifications for imposing a prison term after a
conviction is that it will deter both the defendant (called "special
deterrence") and those similarly situated (called "general deterrence")
from engaging in future violations because the cost of committing a
crime will exceed the benefit.18 But is deterrence relevant in the
sentencing of white-collar defendants? It is certainly questionable
whether a punishment imposed on one white-collar criminal has an
impact on others because the violations are usually the product of a
unique set of circumstances that allowed the crime to occur, and the
offenders often do not believe they engaged in wrongdoing that needs to
be deterred. General deterrence is about sending out a message, but it is
one that may not be heard by its intended audience.
18. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and
State Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 43 (2008) ("Utilitarian (or
consequentialist) purposes of punishment focus on the desirable effects (mainly, future
crime reduction) which punishments have on the offender being punished, or on other
would-be offenders, and on the costs and undesired consequences of punishments. The
most widely accepted of these purposes are the following: special (or individual, or
specific) deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation of the offender (because he is
thought likely to commit further crimes); general deterrence of other would-be violators
through fear of receiving similar punishment; and a more diffuse, long-term form of
deterrence (sometimes referred to as expressive or denunciation purposes) which focuses
on the norm-defining and norm-reinforcing effects that penalties have on the public's
views about the relative seriousness, harmfulness, or wrongness of various crimes.").
2015]
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The Supreme Court has given federal judges broad discretion in
deciding the appropriate punishment for someone convicted of a crime.
Congress requires judges to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary" to address a range of factors that includes "the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense."1 9 These lofty considerations provide
little concrete guidance to the judge contemplating the appropriate
sentence. For most white-collar offenders, there are no mandatory
minimum prison terms, unlike drug and child pornography cases,2" so it
is possible in some cases that a defendant need not be incarcerated, and
only be subject to restrictions like home confinement. So we are left with
the question: How much and what type of punishment is sufficient for a
white-collar offender who poses little risk to the physical safety of
others, often with no prior record of illegal conduct, and is, historically, a
productive member of society? If the parameters for punishment in
white-collar prosecutions lie somewhere between the sentences meted
out to Bernie Madoff and Ty Warner, then we have almost no guidance
for the appropriate punishment for this type of criminal.21
White-collar crimes put judges in a particularly difficult position
because in most cases there will be at least some evidence to support
finding that the defendant is worthy of mercy so that imposing a term of
imprisonment will not improve or protect society. It is at this point that
general deterrence has an important role to play, even if it may be
ineffective in reaching the stated goal of convincing others not to engage
in wrongdoing. Deterrence has value in the process of imposing
punishment because it works to keep judges from succumbing to the
impulse to see white-collar defendants in the warm light of a contrite
individual who engaged in aberrational conduct but is unlikely to offend
again.22 If the message of a criminal sentence is one delivered to society
and not just the particular individual before the court, then deterrence
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (West 2014).
20. Federal Mandatory Minimums, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS,
http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Chart-All-Fed-MMs-NW.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015).
21. See STANTON WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN SARAT, SITTING IN
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 10 (1988) ("Even though
some minimal consensus on the legitimate purposes of sentencing has been reached-the
usual litany includes deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and some form of either
'desert' or 'retribution'-there are no standards by which these purposes can be graded
and combined in individual cases.").
22. Id. at 165 ("In sentencing white-collar offenders, judges are torn between leniency
and severity. While deterrence pulls judges in the direction of incarceration,
consideration of the effects of incarceration on the offender and on his immediate social
network pulls in the opposite direction.").
[Vol. 61:1
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provides a meaningful avenue to ensure that punishments reflect the
judicial goal of preventing future crimes regardless of whether there is
any real impact on those who might succumb to the temptation to
commit a crime.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
Offenders that come within the category of "white-collar criminals"
are generally quite different from most of those who commit ordinary
street crimes. They are, for the most part, older and better educated, with
no appreciable history of prior convictions or incarceration,23 with a
higher percentage of white males than the overall federal prison
population;24 the offenses are predominantly non-violent,25 and the
collateral consequences of a violation are thought to be much greater due
to the likely loss of employment, social status, and the like.26 As
Professor Brown pointed out, "White-collar offenders .... except for
those white-collar crimes that plainly mimic street crimes-for example,
embezzling from an employer is stealing, and credit card or insurance
fraud are just other forms of theft-are more reasonable, mainstream
people."
27
23. J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
1199, 1273 n.48 (1999) ("Studies have shown that white collar defendants are more
likely to be white and male, better educated, and older than other defendants.").
24. See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 8 (Sept.
2014) ("Black males had higher imprisonment rates across all age groups than all other
races and Hispanic males. In the age range with the highest imprisonment rates for males
(ages twenty five to thirty nine), black males were imprisoned at rates at least 2.5 times
greater than Hispanic males and 6 times greater than white males.")
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl3.pdf; see also Max Schanzenbach & Michael L.
Yaeger, Prison Time, Fines, and Federal White-Collar Criminals: The Anatomy of A
Racial Disparity, 96 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 774-75 (2006) (finding that 64%
of the white-collar defendants sentenced were male, and 54% white, with an average age
of thirty-eight years old.)
25. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING CHEATING, AND & STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 35 (2006) ("White-collar crime ... often is committed through
non-violent means; causes harm that is incorporeal, such as financial loss or injury to an
institution; and occurs at a nonspecific physical location over a difficult-to-define period
of time.").
26. See WHEELER et al., supra note 21, at 65 ("The absence of violence in white-
collar cases has the additional consequence of requiring judges to distinguish between
levels of harm without the benefit of the dimension of violence. This has the effect of
elevating the significance of the other attributes of white collar offenses for sentencing
purposes.").
27. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1315 (2001) [hereinafter "Brown, Street
Crime"].
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Sentencing white-collar offenders presents vexing issues in
determining the appropriate punishment for conduct that may not
immediately appear criminal, or that may involve amorphous victims,
such as the "market" or a faceless organization that does not suffer in the
same way that one who is robbed or assaulted would. Moreover, the
defendant may pose little risk of recidivism, at least for violations that
are one-time transgressions rather than a systematic theft or fraud
scheme, so the notion of specific deterrence to keep the person from
violating the law again can be largely irrelevant.28 The need for
rehabilitation is also minimal because the offenders readily grasp the
seriousness of the violation-assuming they agree that a crime has been
committed-and the harm resulting from the conviction on the offender,
as well as third parties, may equal to or exceed the impact of the
sentence.29 The requirement to protect society by isolating offenders is
equally minimal because there is little physical threat posed by their
presence.3°
28. It has been noted that recidivism rates for white-collar offenders may understate
the actual rate at which they violate the law, due to the complexity of pursuing these
offenses. See Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and
White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286, 291 (2007) ("It is also worth
noting that recidivism rates may underrepresent the actual rate at which white-collar
defendants have engaged in repeated offenses. White-collar prosecutions are notoriously
difficult to pursue successfully because they depend on complex financial records and
often arcane regulatory schemes, and white-collar defendants are often represented by
skilled and well-financed attorneys. As a result, a "first time" white-collar offender may
have engaged in prior frauds without being detected, charged, and convicted.").
29. See Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J.
823, 870 (2014) ("The street offender confronts lots and lots of police officers but-aside
from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement-no specialized police forces,
no major considerations about how to deal with problems of parallel proceedings,
including civil litigation, and (except with immigration offenses) no employer-sponsored
policing program. Of course, the average street offender would be unlikely to care about
civil liability. He lacks the assets, economic standing, and social position that typically
make civil enforcement matter to a person. His additional problems--and they are serious
and growing--come after conviction, in the form of extensive collateral consequences of a
felony record--which also of course apply to convicted white collar offenders, who can
face additional collateral effects such as professional or industry debarment."); Podgor,
supra note 1, at 739 ("Unlike the plumber or gardener, a white collar offender is often
unable to return to his or her livelihood after serving imprisonment. Licensing,
debarment, and government exclusion from benefits may preclude these professionals
from resuming the livelihoods held before their convictions.").
30. Cf Elizabeth Fuerbacher, Fuerbacher '13.5: Reduce jail time for white-collar
crime, BROWN DAILY HERALD (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.browndailyherald.com/2014/02/21/reduce-jail-time-white-collar-crime/
("Theoretically, prison serves two purposes: to contain an offender so he cannot harm
others and to provide a sufficiently unpleasant experience so he is deterred from
[Vol. 61:1
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People who operate in the white-collar world seem to be the likeliest
candidates to be aware of a prison sentence imposed on someone in the
same industry, and to respond by avoiding future misconduct, even for
actions that may appear to be typical in the modem business
environment. Headline generating punishments like the 150-year prison
term for Bernie Madoff,31 to the eleven years given to Raj Rajaratnam for
insider trading, 32 ought to have a substantial deterrent effect because the
business community pays attention to what happens to its members. Of
course, there is no way to measure the amount of actual deterrence,
because there are no reliable statistics which show how many crimes do
not occur because of a fear of being caught and punished. Those who
obey the law, for whatever reason, constitute the great majority of
individuals, and it is difficult to assess what role prosecutions and
punishments play in their decision to live law-abiding lives.
For those who do engage in white-collar crimes, a recent study of
sentences given for insider trading shows a 31.8% increase over a five-
year period ending in December 2013, as compared to the previous five
years.33 It should be noted that the average insider trading sentence
moved from 13.1 months to 17.3,34 which is not exactly draconian when
compared to the prison terms handed out for drugs and child
pornography. The average sentence for fraud has increased by about 30%
between 2006 and 2013, increasing from 18.6 months to 24 months. 35
Spending eighteen months to two years in prison is no picnic, especially
undertaking future felonious actions.... For securities fraud or RICO Act violations,
treble damages can be imposed against perpetrators. These people are required not only
to compensate the government for misappropriated profits or avoided losses but also to
pay hefty penalties. Hence, incarceration for people who have already returned their gains
is inordinate. This assessment is particularly relevant for the majority of insider traders,
whose gains are inconsequential in terms of harming society. Let's be honest: A few
million dollars generated in profits from private information is insignificant in the grand
scheme of things. So long as they return their ill-obtained funds and are fined, these
individuals do not need to be jailed.").
3 1. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32. Susan Pulliam & Chad Bray, Trader Draws Record Sentence, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
14, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052970203914304576627191081876286.
33. Nate Raymond, Insider Traders in U.S. Face Longer Prison Terms, REUTERS
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/us-insidertrading-prison-
insight-idUSKBNOGXOA820140902.
34. Id.
35. Mark H. Allenbaugh, "Drawn From Nowhere": A Reivew of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's White-Collar Guideines and Loss Data, 26 FED. SENT. R. 19, 19 (2013).
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when many are first-time offenders who have never had a serious brush
with the law before and are unaccustomed to prison life.36
But the increased sentences for a quintessential white-collar crime
like insider trading, whose perpetrators have included corporate
chieftains37 and billionaire investors, 38 should be expected to have an
appreciable deterrent effect on others. One might surmise that there
would be a sharp-or at least perceptible-decline in the number of
offenses involving economic crimes as the punishments imposed have
increased, which in a few cases have amounted to effectively imposing a
life sentence.
39
36. Consider the view of Richard Bistrong, who was sentenced to prison for paying
overseas bribes in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, about the impact of
prison on a white-collar offender:
The loss of liberty, even for my own fourteen and a half-months, is an awful
experience, and no amount of personal financial or corporate upside is worth that
price. While my time at the Federal Camp at Lewisburg passed without incident,
and I used my time to help others with their educational challenges as a GED and
English as a Second Language instructor, the time away from family and friends
can never be replaced. I missed events in the life of my family from which there
are no "re-enactments."
The impact of saying good bye to a wife and children knowing that your only
remaining contact will be in a visiting room for an extended period of time is
nothing but traumatic. Trying to "coach" my children through their college and
grad-school application processes via time delayed e-mails and limited phone calls,
was difficult at best. Using up phone minutes before the end of a month knowing
you won't get to hear the voices of loved ones until they re-up next month was a
gut-wrenching experience. It is not worth it, not even close.
Richard Bistrong, Deterrence, You Had Me At "Being Caught", RICHARD BISTRONG
FCPA BLOG (July 7, 2014), http://richardbistrong.blogspot.com/2014/07/deterrence-you-
had-me-had-likelihood-of.html.
37. See, e.g., United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001) (Prosecution
of the former president, CEO and Chairman of investment bank Keefe Bruyette &
Woods).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2820 (U.S. 2014) (Prosecution of the fraud of hedge fund Galleon
Group, which "at its pinnacle.., employed dozens of portfolio managers, analysts, and
traders, and invested billions of dollars of client funds."); see also S.E.C. v. Cuban, 620
F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010) (The SEC pursued civil insider trading charges against Mark
Cuban, the billionaire owner of the Dallas Mavericks, but a jury ultimately ruled in his
favor after a trial).
39. In addition to Bernie Madoff, others receiving significant prison terms for large
scale frauds that in all likelihood exceed their reasonable life expectancy include R. Allen
Stanford (110 years), Scott Rothstein (50 years), and Thomas Petters (50 years). See Joe
Palazzolo, A Reordering of the Top 10 White Collar Prison Sentences?, Wall St. J. (Dec.
11, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2013/12/I I/a-reordering-of-the-top- 10-
white-collar-prison-sentences/. The longest fraud sentence appears to be the 835-year
prison term imposed on Sholam Weiss for perpetrating a fraud that led to the collapse of
a life insurance company, costing customers $125 million. See Middle District of Florida
[Vol. 61:1
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The general perception that the amount of white-collar crime is on
the increase is, conversely, quite apparent-at least if one looks at the
attention lavished by the media on prominent cases involving insider
trading, interest rate manipulation, and the like.40 The United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, was
pictured on the cover of Time magazine behind the headline "This Man is
Busting Wall St. ' 41 The ignominious "perp walk" once used for mobsters
is now applied to defendants from the business world who present no
apparent risk of violence-although it makes for a nice picture on the
front page of the newspaper. The widespread view that white-collar
crime is on the rise is further reinforced by the absence of criminal cases
from high profile events like the financial crisis. Many lament the lack of
prosecutions related to the creation and marketing of subprime mortgage-
backed securities, contending that much less money would have been
lost if not for the fraudulent acts of Wall Street executives.42 Add to that
the belief that white-collar crimes usually have a much greater economic
impact because of the large number of potential victims, and the view
that it poses a significant threat to society is easily understood.43
U.S. Attorney's Office, Court of Appeals Affirms Sholam Weiss' Convictions on
Racketeering, Fraud, and Money Laundering Charges, FED BUREAU INVESTIGATION
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/tampa/press-releases/2013/court-of-appeals-affirms-
sholam-weiss-convictions-on-racketeering-fraud-and-money-laundering-charges.
40. See DAVID WEISBURD, STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING & NANCY BODE,
CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 183
(1991) ("We believe that ordinary people are committing white-collar crime in increasing
numbers. One reason is that ordinary people now have greater access to the white-collar
world of paper fraud."); Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United
States: A Work in Progress, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54 (2013) ("Whether driven
by public interest or schadenfreude, media coverage gives these cases of financial scandal
and public corruption a profile disproportionate to their number.") [hereinafter "Richman,
White Collar Sentencing"].
41. This Man Is Busting Wall Street, TIME (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0, 16641,20120213,00.html.
42. As Professor Richman put it quite well:
Once we put bad analogies aside and squarely try to figure out whether
widespread criminal misconduct drove-or was even associated with-the
financial crisis, we face one of the classic accountability problems in federal
criminal law: since a financial collapse is not itself evidence of criminal
conduct, and white collar criminal activity is rarely revealed with any clarity
except by those responsible for prosecuting crimes, how does one assess the
adequacy of those prosecutorial efforts?
Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 268 (2014).
43. See WHEELER et al., supra note 21, at 2-3 ("But white-collar crimes are probably
more significant than street crimes from a purely economic perspective, and such crimes
often have the capacity to weaken trust and faith in the basic institutions of society.").
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Gathering reliable data on white-collar crime is difficult because
there are so many different offenses that fall within the category, at least
as compared to the traditional common law crimes like murder, robbery
and assault. The primary statistical reporting system for crimes focuses
mainly on street crimes that are prosecuted at the state and local level,
not white-collar crimes that are more often the subject of federal
investigation." Part of the problem is the inadequacy of measures
typically used to track crime, such as police crime reports and victim
surveys. There are no calls to the local police to report tax evasion, and it
is the rare case in which inflated corporate revenue or misreported costs
are noticed until long after the filing of an audit report. These are
crimes built on deception, and their commission is rarely apparent to the
casual observer, unlike when a package of heroin is intercepted or a body
is found with multiple gunshot wounds, so that it is obvious a crime took
place.
Even looking at those cases that develop to the point at which
charges are filed, white-collar crimes are relatively small in number. For
example, at the federal level, in April 2014, the Department of Justice
reported filing 640 new prosecutions for white-collar crimes, and the
peak number in the past few years has been about 1,000 cases in a
month.46 In 2010, fraud offenses constituted approximately 10% of the
arrests for federal crimes, totaling 15,685 individuals, while arrests for
immigration (82,438) and drug (28,850) offenses constituted
approximately 62%. 47 State prosecutions focus more on common street
offenses involving property theft, drugs, and familial violence than more
sophisticated economic crimes, although there are exceptions, such as the
44. See CYNTHIA BARNETT, THE MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) DATA, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/about-
us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrswcc.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) ("The preference toward street
crime reflected in [the National Incident-Based Reporting System] is a result of the fact
that state and local agencies, not federal agencies, were originally surveyed during the
development stage. White collar crime usually falls under the jurisdiction of federal
agencies, and so specialized offenses (i.e., those not considered fraud, embezzlement,
counterfeiting, or bribery) are not as well represented in NIBRS offense categories as are
street crimes.").
45. See Richman, White Collar Sentencing, supra note 40, at 64 ("This is a world
where reporting 'victims' have often not suffered their losses as a result of criminal
conduct, and where real 'victims' of crimes are often unaware.").
46. See White Collar Crime Prosecutions for April 2014, TRAc REPORTS,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/whitecollarcrime/monthlyaprl4/fi/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015).
47. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010 - STATISTICAL TABLES (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjslOst.pdf.
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New York City District Attorney.48 For a crime like obstruction of
justice, the volume of prosecutions for crimes in the federal system is
fairly small, usually numbering less than 200 per year, as compared to
the thousands of drug and immigration offenses. So the reduced number
of cases is unlikely to have much deterrent effect unless one case
happens to catch the general public's attention.49
That is not to say white-collar crime is unimportant or not worthy of
the attention prosecutors and investigators give it. Ponzi schemes that are
modest compared to Bernie Madoff' s multibillion dollar fraud still affect
thousands of individuals who lose a significant portion of their life
savings, along with similar scams involving advanced loan fees and
worthless investments that routinely inflict enormous damage on
individuals and small businesses. The FBI estimates that fraud affects
from three to ten percent of health care billings, which are over $500
48. See Martin F. Murphy, No Room at the Inn? Punishing White-Collar Criminals,
40 JUN B. B.J. 4, 16 ("So long as local district attorneys' offices and local police
departments see that street crime is the public's top priority, there is no reason to believe
that they will be able to devote more than a small fraction of their limited resources to the
investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime. The defendants that state court
judges are likely to see, and have occasion to sentence, will continue to be mostly armed
robbers, drug dealers, house-breakers, and rapists, not white-collar defendants."). The
New York District Attorney's Office in Manhattan helped investigate money laundering
and violations of the economic sanctions laws, participating in settlements along with the
Department of Justice and civil regulatory agencies. See Susanne Craig & James C.
McKinley Jr., BNP Paribas Guilty Plea Is Latest Big Settlement to Bolster New York
State's Fiscal Position, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/nyregion/brip-paribas-guilty-plea-is-latest-big-
settlement-to-bolster-new-york-states-fiscal-position.html (noting that the New York
District Attorney received $2.2 billion from a settlement with BNP Paribas for violating
economic sanctions law); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay Record Fine to Settle
Money-Laundering Charges, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (December 11, 2012, 2:17 p.m.),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/1 ifhsbc-to-pay-record-fine-to-settle-money-
laundering-charges/ (noting that a HSBC money laundering settlement included a
deferred prosecution agreement with New York District Attorney).
49. See Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea
Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 741-42 (2013) ("Following the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, there was only an average of 182 prosecutions per year in
which obstruction of justice was the most serious offense charged. While this was
significantly more than during the period before 2002, this is hardly a number that will
convince potential offenders that the risk of apprehension outweighs the potential gains
from their conduct. While Congress may have intended a much larger increase in focus
on obstruction offenses, such focus did not materialize; consequently, these reforms are
unlikely to yield substantial results. If Congress truly wanted to deter obstruction of
justice offenses, it should have dramatically increased funding for law enforcement focus
and casework in this area, rather than turning to overcriminalization once again.").
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
billion a year.5° What might look like modest accounting maneuvers can
lead to significant losses in a company, which can trigger the loss of
thousands of jobs. While one might have little sympathy for the
government when it loses tax revenue, or for a defrauded insurance
company or bank, the costs of white-collar crimes are spread throughout
the economy so that everyone feels the effect.
51
III. DETERRENCE AND RETRIBUTION
"[T]here can be no case in which the law-maker makes certain
conduct criminal without his thereby showing a wish and purpose to
prevent that conduct. Prevention would accordingly seem to be the chief
and only universal purpose ofpunishment. ,52
The two primary justifications cited for imposing punishment for
conduct deemed criminal are deterrence and retribution, sometimes
called "just deserts." While other rationales have been offered, such as
incapacitation and rehabilitation, most theories of punishment revolve
around these two concepts. Deterrence, which is an expression of
utilitarianism, is a determination that a particular punishment will be
sufficient to create a benefit to society by preventing future misconduct
over the costs of investigating, prosecuting, and (where necessary)
incarcerating. 53 Under an economic analysis of the criminal law
pioneered by Professor Becker in 1968,54 deterrence occurs where a
potential offender will commit a crime only if the benefits exceed the
expected sanction, so that increasing the likelihood and amount of
punishment should reduce the rate of offenses.
5
50. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE
PUBLIC, 2010-2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-
report-2010-201 1.
51. See Jorgen Wouters, One in Four Households Victim of White Collar Crime:
Report, DAILYFINANCE (Dec. 13, 2010, 3:23 PM) (noting that white-collar crime affects
more Americans than any other type of crime).
52. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 46, 1 (1881).
53. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Theory and Criminal Justice Practice, 49
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 73, 74 (2012) ("Utilitarianism, the most prominent version of a
consequentialist theory, assesses acts and institutions on whether they produce a net
benefit, and this is the typical consequentialist ground by which criminal punishment is
assessed-whether gains in crime reductions are greater than the costs of punishment
policy.") [hereinafter "Brown, Criminal Law Theory"].
54. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
55. See Murat C. Mungan, The Law and Economic of Fluctuating Criminal
Tendencies and Incapacitation, 72 MD. L. REV. 156, 170 (2012).
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There are two types of deterrence: specific and general.56 The former
focuses on limiting the defendant's recidivism by incapacitating the
person for a period of time and demonstrating the cost of future
violations, especially under statutes that impose enhanced punishment on
repeat offenders.57 The latter is concerned with preventing others from
engaging in similar misconduct in the future, focusing on communicating
a message that other violators will be punished similarly.58 There are
three components to an effective deterrent: "The greater the perceived
certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment, the lower the crime rate
will be." 59 Studies have shown that certainty of punishment is the
principle factor in assessing the success of a deterrent, so that increased
spending on detection will have more of an appreciable impact on the
crime rate than increasing the level of punishment imposed on those
convicted of a violation.60 Even a greater likelihood of being caught will
not have much impact in deterring a violation if the timing of a
prosecution is delayed long enough so that the miscreant discounts the
effect of any punishment.6'
Unlike the consequentialist approach, retribution mirrors society's
moral judgment that certain conduct deserves punishment that reflects
56. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution As an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000)
("Deterrence treats punishment as a tool of social control and protection, employing its
threat as a disincentive to dissuade potential criminals from offending (general
deterrence), or its experience to dissuade a particular criminal from reoffending (specific
deterrence).").
57. See id.
58. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
425 (1999) ("Deterrence theorists typically assess the efficiency of a punishment for its
contribution to both 'general deterrence,' which refers to the effect that punishing a
particular offender has on the behavior of the population generally, and to 'specific
deterrence,' which refers to the impact of a punishment on the offender's own behavior, a
usage that brings the aim of incapacitation within the ambit of deterrence broadly
understood.").
59. Gary Kleck, Brion Sever, Spencer Li & Marc Gertz, The Missing Link in General
Deterrence Research, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 623, 625-26 (2005).
60. See Carlton Gunn & Myra Sun, Sometimes the Cure is Worse Than the Disease:
The One-Way White-Collar Sentencing Ratchet, 38 HUM. RTs. 9, 12 (2011) ("A wealth of
studies suggest, perhaps especially in the case of white-collar offenders but also more
generally, that it is the certainty of punishment, i.e., the certainty of being caught, that
deters more than the extent of punishment once caught.").
61. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
954 (2003) ("[A] delay between violation and punishment can dramatically reduce the
perceived sot of the violation. Even if the punishment is certain, the more distant it is, the
more its weight as a threat will be discounted.").
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the seriousness of the crime, usually measured by the harm it caused.62
The punishment imposed demonstrates the community's disapproval of
the conduct, so what is communicated to the defendant, and society at
large, is the extent of disapprobation-and even indignation or anger-at
what the person did and how others suffered because of the
misconduct.63 The proposed revision to the Model Penal Code provides
that sentencing starts from the premise that punishment for a crime
should be "proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to
crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders," while other goals,
such as rehabilitation or incapacitation, should be considered "within the
boundaries of proportionality." 64 Retribution is more emotive than
deterrence, reflecting a judgment of the offender's character as
interpreted through the person's choice to engage in criminal conduct
and the resultant harm; that character judgment leads to the
determination of a reasonable punishment, even if there is no broader
benefit to society from imposing a sanction.65
Victim impact statements can be an important component to the
sentencing process because they help the court assess the actual harm
resulting from the illegal conduct. 6 Nine victims spoke at Madoff's
62. See Cotton, supra note 56, at 1315-16 ("[P]unishment is directed at imposing
merited harm upon the criminal for his wrong, and not at the achievement of social
benefits.").
63. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, WHY PUNISH? How
MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 113 (Michael Tonry ed. 2011) ("[P]unishment is a
conventional devise for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of
judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part of either the punishing authority
himself or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.").
64. See Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like A Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REv. 727,
728-29 (2009) ("When the Code retreats to retributive or desert theory as a source of
sentencing reform, it appeals to indeterminate and unpredictable principles that threaten
to undermine the new provisions' more salutary proposals.").
65. See Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required:
Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751, 765 (2005) ("A
venerable deontological tradition with roots in Kantian retributivism holds that
punishment is justified only as a response to wrongdoing by the offender and not by its
consequential effects."); Cotton, supra note 56, at 1315-16 ("Retribution, as
distinguished from utilitarian purposes, is conceived as necessary even when social
benefit will not be achieved."); Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The
Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face
Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REv. 995, 1025 (1991) ("Retributivism... displays its
Kantian roots in that it rests on a foundation of respect for persons as beings capable of
directing their actions through the exercise of reason.").
66. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM
L. 611, 632 (2009) ("Victim impact statements reveal information about the crime-and
particularly about the harm of a crime-which makes them quite relevant to a core
purpose of sentencing: ensuring that the punishment fits the crime. Proper punishment
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sentencing, telling of the pain his actions caused them.67 When Judge
Chin spoke about the symbolic meaning of the 150-year sentence, he
pointed out that it was not "mob vengeance," but that the punishment
"may, in some small measure, help these victims in their healing
process. ' 68 Thus, the prison term was largely an appeal to the retributive
demand of society for the harm Madoff inflicted.
If deterrence were the sole, or even primary, goal of punishment,
then a reasonable argument can be made that a system of fines would be
more efficient than incarceration, at least for white-collar offenders. As
then-Professor Posner (before his appointment to the federal bench) once
put it, "[F]ining the affluent offender is preferable to imprisoning him
from society's standpoint because it is less costly and no less
efficacious., 69 At its core, the consequentialist approach to punishment
relies on the ability of similarly situated individuals to comprehend when
the costs of illegal-or at least highly suspect-conduct outweigh the
benefits and then react rationally to that determination. Of course, the
rational decision-maker may view the fine as a form of taxation and so
will factor in that cost in deciding whether to act, unless it is so
expensive as to render any decision to proceed uneconomical; however,
that could violate the constitutional prohibition on excessive fines.7'
cannot be meted out unless judges and juries know the dimensions of the crime and the
harm it has caused.").
67. Madoff Sentencing Transcript, supra note 5, at 4.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 409, 410 (1980). He explained the reasoning in this way:
In a social cost-benefit analysis of the choice between fining and imprisoning the
white-collar criminal, the cost side of the analysis favors fining because ... the
cost of collecting a fine from one who can pay it (an important qualification) is
lower than the cost of imprisonment. On the benefit side, there is no difference in
principle between the sanctions. The fine for a white-collar crime can be set at
whatever level imposes the same disutililty on the defendant, and thus yield the
same deterrence, as the prison sentence that would have been imposed instead.
Id.
70. See Brown, Street Crime, supra note 27, at 1325 ("[D]eterrence rhetoric implies
that defendants are rational, reasonable actors who can be expected to respond sensibly to
incentives. This is one reason why, for corporate wrongdoing, civil sanctions often seem
appropriate substitutes for criminal sanctions. When all we are trying to do is deter bad
conduct and foster socially desirable behavior, a civil fine can prompt a rational response
from actors as well as a criminal one.").
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). See Michael D. Silberfarb,
Note, Justifying Punishment for White-Collar Crime: A Utilitarian and Retributive
Analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95, 102 (2003) ("Although
properly distributed criminal fines are perhaps the most efficient and effective means of
deterring corporate crime and expressing society's condemnation, Congress must
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Unlike the moral underpinnings of retribution, deterrence is a more
neutral assessment of costs and benefits, so that a significant punishment,
including long prison terms, can be justified without regard to a
defendant's circumstances, so long as the benefit to society is
sufficient.72
IV. DOES DETERRENCE WORK FOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES?
"Seeing many things, but thou observest not; opening the ears, but
he heareth not."73
In the federal system, Congress has directed sentencing judges to
consider both deterrence and retribution when imposing punishment on
the convicted defendant. The factors the court must take into account,
after first ascertaining the recommended range of punishment provided
by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, are the need for a sentence to be a
"just punishment for the offense" while affording "adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct .... ,,74 The judge should also look to "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, 75 so that there is
a measure of uniformity among sentences. Professor Brown noted that
the "debate tends to center on the relative weight that should be accorded
to desert and to deterrence or incapacitation when making punishment
decisions. 76
Talk of deterrence seems to be the primary reason for the imposition
of a range of increasingly harsh punishments in white-collar cases,
including fines doled out to corporations for civil and criminal violations.
supplement these fines with other forms of punishment. Otherwise, potential offenders
will view the fines as a mere tax.").
72. See Brown, Street Crime, supra note 27, at 1296 ("Deterrence ... has no role for
judgment of an offender's fault or culpability except to the extent that expressing such
judgments furthers the deterrent effect of punishment."). A retributivist argument against
the consequentialist approach is that it can be used to justify imposing punishment on an
innocent person. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
"Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 870-71 (2002) ("Because retributivism's
justification for punishment is based on the desert of the punished, and an innocent
presumably does not deserve to be punished, it would seem that retributivism cannot
justify punishment of the innocent. Consequentialist theories are susceptible to the
criticism precisely because they justify punishment by the good consequences to be
attained by punishment. If one of the good consequences sufficient to justify punishment,
for example, general deterrence, may be attained by punishment of the innocent, then
punishment of the innocent is justified under consequentialism.").
73. Isaiah 42:20 (King James).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2014).
75. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
76. See Brown, Criminal Law Theory, supra note 53, at 75.
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Even before the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal
judges viewed the punishment imposed for white-collar crimes almost
exclusively in terms of deterrence.77 The sentences imposed today for
white-collar offenses are much higher, and judges continue to justify
them on the basis of deterrence.78 For example, Peter Madoff received a
ten year prison term for his role in the massive Ponzi scheme of his
brother, Bernie Madoff, although he claimed ignorance to what was
actually going on-something the government seemed to accept in
agreeing to let Peter plead guilty to charges of filing false documents and
lying to regulators, but not helping perpetrate the fraud.7 9 At the
sentencing hearing, Judge Laura Taylor Swain noted that he had "been
an inspiration and a witness for faith and selflessness in the lives of
many, that is clear," and found no likelihood that he would ever engage
in misconduct again.80 Yet, Judge Swain imposed a significant prison
term because "[t]he consequences of such behavior must be harsh to help
deter others from taking the path of dishonest and theft. ' '81
A. Corporate Deterrence
On the corporate front, there have been a number of significant
penalties accepted by banks in settlements with the Department of Justice
and other agencies for their role in shoddy subprime mortgage lending
and the packaging of those loans into securities sold to other investors.
Among the fines are $5 billion paid by Bank of America 82 and $2 billion
77. See Kenneth Mann, Stanton Wheeler & Austin Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar
Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482 (1980) ("In the white-collar area.... the
sentencing purpose and rationale tends to be unidimensional: judges are concerned with
general deterrence, deterring other persons in similar positions from engaging in the same
or like behavior. They tend not to be concerned at all with rehabilitation or incapacitation
and.., only minimally with punishment.").
78. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79. See Peter Lattman & Diana B. Henriques, Peter Madoff Is Sentenced to 10 Years
for His Role in Fruad, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 20, 2012 5:59 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2012/12/20/peter-madoff-is-sentenced-to- I 0-years-for-his-
role-in-fraud/.
80. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 28-29, United States v. Peter Madoff, No. 10-
CR-228 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/cckfmads.pdf.
81. Id. at 29; see WHEELER et al., supra note 21, at 131 ("When harsher criminal
penalties are called for, it is almost always in the belief that potential criminals, acting
rationally, will be deterred from committing crimes by the threat of heavier penalties.
Judges are not immune to these influences, and it is not surprising that general deterrence
is often an important goal for them in their sentencing.").
82. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in
Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the
20151
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
from J.P. Morgan.83 The head of the S.E.C.'s Enforcement Division
talked about seeking increased civil monetary penalties from companies
for securities law violations, stating that "[m]onetary penalties s eak
very loudly and in a language any potential defendant understands."
At least where corporate misconduct takes place, the deterrent
message from a fine, even one counted in the billions of dollars, will not
necessarily be heard outside of the particular industry in which the
company operates. It is certainly true that companies have responded to
how prosecutors and civil regulators have stepped up policing of
corporate misconduct by ramping up compliance programs, even
creating separate departments to handle this function.85 But whether
management at one company knows what actually happened in another
organization or will internalize the threat of sanctions by altering
operations is at least an open question. Unlike an individual who can
visualize being in a similar position to someone who is punished, it is
unlikely corporate officers will consider themselves comparable when
only the organization is punished.
The business operations that generate such large penalties usually
involve hundreds or even thousands of workers, few of whom may see a
fine imposed on one company as having much effect on their personal
actions, even though the company itself may be penalized for their
misconduct. And the paradox of a fine imposed on a public corporation
is that current shareholders pay the price for misconduct, not the officers
or directors responsible for the violations. The violation usually occurred
years in the past, well before many shareholders acquired their stake, so
the notion that a monetary penalty will have any deterrent effect by
encouraging companies to monitor management more closely creates a
Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/August/14-ag-
884.html.
83. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State
Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading
Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.stopfraud.gov/iso/opa/stopfraud/2013/13-ag- 1237.html.
84. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ramps up Fine Amounts to Deter Misconduct, WALL. ST. J.
(Oct. 1, 2013, 3:38 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1000142405270230391880457910955414946053.
85. See Michele DeStefano, Creating A Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 71, 72-73 (2014)
("Over the past few decades, as corporate criminal liability rules, sentencing guidelines,
and settlement incentives have changed, there has been increased emphasis on and
resources devoted to the compliance function at large publicly held companies. What
might have been thought of twenty years ago as a basic corporate governance function is
now being ceded to compliance departments. These compliance departments are
generally in charge of monitoring and ensuring compliance with legal obligations and
ethical standards beyond those legally required.").
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"mismatch between the shareholders that benefit from misconduct and
those that are ultimately punished [that] undermines this rationale."8 6
B. The Impact of Longer Sentences
Even if organizations and their agents are unlikely to be deterred by
criminal punishments imposed only on the company, one might expect
that individuals would be influenced by the sentences imposed on others
and thereby avoid engaging in conduct that can trigger a prosecution.
Research shows, however, that the deterrent effect of punishment is
minimal for both street crimes and white-collar offenses,8 7 while the
likelihood of detection and swift adjudication has a far greater impact. 88
It is the likelihood of a conviction, not just the severity of the
punishment, that influences how individuals act when deciding to pursue
a criminal aim.
8 9
But at least those who operate in the white-collar world seem to be
prime candidates for the message of deterrence from increased
punishment, given their education, higher social and economic standing
that would be negated upon conviction, and greater fear of
incarceration. 9° As Professors Robinson and Darley noted, "We can
86. David B. Rivkin Jr. & John J. Carney, Corporate Crime and Punishment, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 7:22 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732412850457834450242081548.
The authors go on to point out that "[i]n the large number of settlement scenarios where
actual guilt isn't the most pressing or relevant consideration, the fines don't by definition
deter any future misconduct." Id.
87. See Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J.
485, 493 (1999) ("Empirical support regarding deterrence of conventional street crimes is
inconclusive... Although the subject has been researched less extensively, the results of
white-collar crime deterrence studies show a similar inconsistent pattern. There is
lukewarm support for the position that criminal penalties effectively deter corporate
crime.").
88. Id.
89. Cf Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, Deterring Corporate Crime, 30
CRIMINIOLOGY 347, 348 (1992) ("[C]ertainty of sanction is more important than
severity."); Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding
and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CR1M. L. REV.
19, 61 (2003) ("Under deterrence theory, severity is only one of three factors that affect a
sanction's deterrent value; certainty and celerity (or swiftness of punishment) are equally,
if not more, important.").
90. See David Weisburd, Elin Waring, & Ellen Chayet, Specific Deterrence in a
Sample of Offenders Convicted of White-Collar Crimes, 33 CRIMINOLOGY, 587, 589
(1995) ("White-collar crime is seen as a highly rational form of criminality, in which the
risks and rewards are carefully evaluated by potential offenders, and white-collar
criminals are assumed to have much more to lose through sanctions than more common
law violators."); NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTATLER, CHOOSING WHITE COLLAR CRIME
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expect greater deterrent possibilities when dealing with more rational
target audiences, such as white collar offenders." 9' If that supposition is
correct, then one might surmise that white-collar crime would start to
decline, or at least level off, in response to increased sentences for
economic offenses and high-profile signature punishments like the 150-
year prison term imposed on Bernie Madoff.
Yet the number of prosecutions for economic crimes, coupled
with continuing media attention, would seem to indicate there has been
little appreciable impact from the hefty sentences meted out for white-
collar crimes. In 2005, the chief executive of WorldCom, Bernie Ebbers,
received a twenty-five-year prison sentence for accounting fraud that
contributed to the company's downfall.92 A decade later, the chief
executive of ArthroCare, Michael Baker, was sentenced to twenty years
for orchestrating a fraudulent scheme to inflate revenue, which, when
revealed, caused the company's shares to lose $750 million in value.
93
Corporate executives intent on playing with the company's books seem
to pay little heed to the possibility of being sent to prison for a number of
years.94 As two practitioners pointed out, "At some point, piling on even
stiffer maximum sentences for financial crimes produces diminishing, if
any, deterrence results; after twenty-five years for securities fraud, what
172-73 (Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 2006) ("There is reason to
suppose ... that white-collar offenders may be positioned ideally for learning the lessons
of imprisonment. Prison is painful for them in ways that differ from the pains of the
typical street offender .... If nothing else, it shocks and forces them to confront the fact
that many people take their crime seriously."); Carl Emigholz, Note, Utilitarianism,
Retributivism, and the White Collar-Drug Crime Sentencing Disparity: Toward a Unified
Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 583, 609 (2006) ("White-collar offenders
are considered to be more deterrable than their street-crime counterparts; they have more
to lose monetarily and in community standing, and their crimes are often calculated to
bring about a specific profit.").
91. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 61, at 956.
92. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) ("WorldCom
disclosed the fraud to the public on June 25, 2002. WorldCom's stock collapsed, losing
90% of its value, and the company filed for bankruptcy.").
93. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former ArthroCare Executives Sentenced for
Orchestrating $750 Million Securities Fraud Scheme (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.fbi.gov/sanantonio/press-releases/2014/former-arthrocare-executives-
sentenced-for-orchestrating-750-million-securities-fraud-scheme.
94. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1999) ("[F]or
individuals who commit white-collar crimes, the disutility of being in prison at all may be
substantial and the stigma and loss of earning power may depend relatively little on the
length of imprisonment. Thus, such individuals are likely to be risk preferring in
imprisonment, which suggests that less-than-maximal sanctions, combined with relatively
high probabilities of apprehension, may be optimal.").
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is left-'life' imprisonment?" 95 And the impact of prison sentences on
the recidivism rate is no greater for white-collar offenders than for those
who commit street crimes.96
Deterrence has little impact for economic crimes when there is a low
probability of being caught.97 In nineteenth-century England, crowds at
public executions of those convicted of pickpocketing were often the
victims of pickpockets who plied their trade despite the obvious potential
consequence of their action taking place right in front of them.
98
Professors Robinson and Darley criticized the formulation of criminal
law rules based on what they call "deterrence speak," which can be
employed to support a wide variety of prohibitions, including white-
collar crimes such as "tampering with private records [and] corruption in
sporting events ...... 99 They argue that there is usually no real cost-
benefit analysis supporting the invocation of deterrence as a rationale for
a prohibition, and instead "such deterrence language simply may reflect
what has come to be the common mode of expression in modem criminal
law analysis."' 00 So deterrence may explain why society prohibits certain
forms of conduct and authorizes the state to proceed against a defendant
for a violation, but it is not a good means to formulate the appropriate
punishment for a violation if the goal is to prevent others from engaging
in the misconduct. ' 0'
95. Daniel V. Dooley & Mark Radke, Does Severe Punishment Deter Financial
Crimes?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 657 (2010).
96. See WEISBURD et al., supra note 40, at 598 ("In comparing groups of offenders
who did and did not receive a prison sanction, we find little impact of prison on the long-
term likelihood of reoffending."). One reason for the minimal impact of a prison sentence
may be that "a short prison stay ... may not provide more than a marginal impact beyond
the experience of prosecution, conviction, and sentencing." Id. at 599.
97. But see Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It?: The Motives, Mores, and
Character of White Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 401, 435 (2008) ("The
insight that there are two general groups, 'leaders' and 'followers,' is significant.
Followers, who, by their very nature, tend to be passive, naive, less confident, and non-
aggressive people, are more susceptible to deterrence. Effective corporate governance,
accepted and adopted by corporate boards and senior management, that educates,
monitors, and rewards law abiding behavior is more likely to deter 'followers' than
leaders simply because of the personalities of followers."). Although the assertion that
"followers" may be more easily deterred could be correct, it is unclear whether many in
the business world would select that designation, which carries a negative connotation.
98. See David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the
Pickpocket's Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 295 (2002) ("Undeterred by the fate
of their colleagues, pickpockets routinely worked the crowds at public hangings.").
99. Robinson & Darley, supra note 61, at 971-72.
100. Id. at 972.
101. See id. at 976 ("While deterrence may be a good reason for having a criminal
justice system that punishes violators, it is at best ineffective as a guide for distributing
liability and punishment within that system.").
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Why is it that white-collar defendants do not seem to hear the
deterrence message that these significant punishments are intended to
communicate? One possibility is that the message is simply ignored,
especially by those in the upper reaches of management who are the least
likely to be prosecuted and therefore may be more willing to engage in
risky conduct. A person who consciously chooses to cross the line into
illegality, even for a good reason-like trying to keep the company afloat
through tough economic times-will pay little heed to the potential
punishment. For others, like those trading on inside information, they
usually succumb to greed, and thoughts of a potential punishment are
heavily discounted, especially if they believe themselves to be smarter
than those who have been caught and better able to avoid detection.
0 2
Some may convince themselves that the conduct is benign, like taking an
extra serving of ice cream, without considering the consequences of their
conduct.10 3 Regardless of the reason for violating the law, a potential
prison term has no appreciable deterrent effect on these white-collar
102. For example, Matthew Kluger received the longest prison term given out for
insider trading when it was imposed-twelve years. In an interview, he explained why he
did not think he would ever be caught:
[Question:] Back before you were ever arrested, was there a time when it occurred
to you that you might end up in jail?
[Answer:] No. Well, I always knew that I was committing crimes that could land
me in jail, but when I got arrested, this scheme was over. We were done. I had
moved on. I wasn't working in the law business anymore. So I had put it behind
me and was going off into the sunset. We unfortunately did one or two too many.
But no, I really did fully believe that I was going to be able to ride off into the
sunset and that no one would ever know that it happened.
I never thought that if I did get caught and if we did get in trouble that it would be
a twelve year sentence and quite as life-changing as it's been.
Daniel Roberts, Life Behind Bars: Matthew Kluger Reveals All, FORTUNE (July 7, 2014
9:50 AM), http://fortune.com/20l4/07/07/matthew-kluger-talks/.
103. For example, Scott London was a partner at accounting firm KPMG who passed
on information about clients to a friend from his golf club whose jewelry business
suffered during the financial crisis in 2008 and needed to generate some income. In an
interview, he explained how he came to commit the crime:
MarketWatch: I find this fascinating: There was never a moment where you
decided, "This is where I am going to break the law."
London: It happened so slowly, there wasn't really a moment. It was about a year
and a half from when it went from him asking for public information, saying,
"Would you be willing to..." to, "Can you give me non-public information?" Then
I thought, 'Oh, s***. I really shouldn't be doing this.' I thought, 'Would the
friendship withstand me saying no?' I think we still would have been friends today.
I was not sticking up (for myself) when I should have. But I agreed to do that. I
take the blame.
Quentin Fottrell, Confessions of Insider Trader Scott London, MARKETWATCH (June 25,
2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/confessions-of-an-insider-trader-
2014-06-21.
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offenders because "the anticipation of rewards and punishments in the
future has startlingly little effect on human behavior when compared to
rewards and punishments in the present.'
0 4
C. Rationalizations of White-Collar Offenders
The "hardened criminal" view of white-collar offenders does not
explain why most of these individuals engage in conduct that results in a
criminal conviction. Instead, as Edwin Sutherland once noted,
"Businessmen develop rationalizations which conceal the fact of
crime." 105 One reason why otherwise law-abiding persons run afoul of
the law appears to be that they engage in a process of "neutralization" to
minimize their misconduct.10 6 This means that "the individual uses words
and phrases during an internal dialogue that makes the behavior
acceptable in her mind (such as by telling herself she is 'borrowing' the
money and will pay it back), thus keeping her perception of herself as an
honest citizen intact."'' 0 7 Thus, as Professor Darley points out, what looks
in hindsight like the outcome of a rational, deliberative process may in
fact be quite different, so that "the person or group acted impulsively in a
way that, at the time, did not appear to be wrong. In retrospect, however,
those initial questionable actions set off a chain of conduct that
ultimately crossed the line into criminal behavior.'
0 8
Although these explanations may look like typical post-hoc
rationalizations to justify or excuse intentional misconduct, for white-
collar defendants, they are an integral part of the reason for pursuing the
course of conduct. By creating the rationale, it helps the person
understand the conduct and integrate it into his life as something that is
not aberrational.109 This allows the offender to maintain a sense of
104. Robinson & Darley, supra note 61, at 200. In a corporate organization, the
"individual who commits a crime often does not psychologically understand his first
actions to be criminal." Id. at 199.
105. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 222 (1949).
106. See Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L.
REv. 3143 (2014).
107. Id. at 3161.
108. John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing
the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 189, 199 (2005); see also Larry E.
Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. Bus & TECH. L. 59, 60 (2007)
("Even if we could increase criminal liability enough to achieve significant marginal
deterrence for the most aggressively overconfident managers, it still may be a bid idea
because of the risk of deterring beneficial corporate conduct.").
109. See James William Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar
Crime, 93 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 406, 411 (1987) ("To interactionists, a rationalization is not
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dignity to avoid the label of "criminal," a type of impression
management technique.110
Depending on the type of violation, the white-collar defendant may
use a variety of excuses to deflect responsibility for the offense.
Professor Benson noted a consistent pattern involving "denial of criminal
intent, as opposed to the outright denial of any criminal behavior
whatsoever.""' Professor Coleman points to techniques like denying
harm from the conduct or claiming that the law is unnecessary or even
unjust, or that, in business organizations, there is a need to conform and
meet economic goals. 12 For crimes in a corporate setting, Professors
Kieffer and Sloan note that "learning neutralizations may take place as
part of routine professional socialization processes that occur in complex
organizations.,' 
3
Unlike street crimes, in which defendants may deny being the
perpetrator, white-collar defendants never offer an alibi defense by
claiming that someone else engaged in the conduct while they were
elsewhere, passing the time with innocent pursuits. 14 So cases involving
the trading of stock, corporate accounting entries, or filing relevant
documents is often promptly acknowledged by the defendants." 15 Instead,
the key issue is proving the person's intent when engaging in those acts,
whether it is use of material nonpublic information in breach of a
fiduciary duty by trading, knowledge of the accounting rules for
recording a transaction, or the completeness of a disclosure in a public
filing. 16 Thus, the explanation offered by a defendant in a white-collar
case will be much different from those advanced in a street crime
prosecution. Moreover, the rationalization that allows an otherwise law-
an after-the-fact excuse that someone invents to justify his or her behavior but an integral
part of the actor's motivation for the act.").
110. See Michael L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in
a White-Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 587 (1985).
111. Id. at 589.
112. Coleman, supra note 109, at 411-12.
113. Scott M. Kieffer & John J. Sloan III, Overcoming Moral Hurdles: Using
Techniques of Neutralization by White-Collar Suspects as an Interrogation Tool, 22
SECURITY J. 317, 324 (2009).
114. Cf FRANK J. DIMARINO & CLIFF ROBERSON, INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE AND
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 32 (2013) ("Few white-collar crime cases involve the identity of
the perpetrator, or whether or not the perpetrator had an alibi.").
115. See id. ("Henning states that white-collar crimes are fundamentally crimes of
intent because the defendants in such cases freely acknowledge their involvement in the
transactions or events.").
116. See id. ("The issue is generally what the defendant knew, or wanted, or failed to
disclose, which raises an issue as to whether a crime actually took place.").
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abiding person to engage in criminal conduct usually begins with small
steps that can be easily explained, at least at first."
7
The white-collar defendant might claim to have simply been
following established rules as he or she understood them, or that
technical compliance with some provisions shows the person did not
want to commit a crime.' 18 Any number of defendants accused of white-
collar crimes will claim they are in fact innocent of any wrongdoing
because no harm was intended, or that a violation never really occurred,
so their conviction is a matter of misguided (and overly aggressive)
prosecutors who do not understand how businesses operate and venal
associates who cut deals to avoid prison time by pointing the finger at
them." 9 For example, Joseph Nacchio, former chief executive of Qwest
Communications, was convicted of insider trading and served over four
years in prison for selling $52 million in company shares before
disclosure of significant financial problems. 120 He claims that he never
committed a crime when selling his shares and the prosecution was in
fact retaliatory for his refusal to comply with National Security Agency
requests to access customer phone records.' 2 ' A former mortgage
company chief executive, convicted for his role in an extensive multi-
billion dollar fraud, filed a motion to set aside the conviction and
sentence on the ground that "Lee Farkas, who is actually innocent, has
117. See Scott Killingsworth, "C" Is for Crucible: Behavioral Ethics, Culture, and the
Board's Role in C-suite Compliance (May 29, 2013),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2271840 ("If we can dodge or
obfuscate the ethical implications of our actions, we can take what we want and still hold
ourselves in high regard. We may reason that a small infraction does no one harm, that it
solved an urgent problem, that the general rule was not meant to apply to our specific
situation, that it's expected and everyone does it, that we had no choice, or that another,
more important rule or value takes priority (such as loyalty over compliance). A suitable
rationalization resolves the cognitive dissonance between our positive self-concept and
the reality that we have violated a rule for selfish reasons."). Id.
118. See WHEELER, supra note 21, at 18 ("[I]n white-collar cases, far more often than
in common crimes, the very existence of a crime may be in dispute, and matters of intent
and motive are often ambiguous.").
119. See Benson, supra note 110, at 597 ("Typically, they claim to have been set up by
associates and to have been wrongfully convicted by the U.S. Attorney handling the case.
One might call this the scapegoat strategy. Rather than admitting technical wrongdoing
and then justifying or excusing it, the offender attempts to pain himself as a victim by
shifting the blame entirely to another party. Prosecutors were presented as being either
ignorant or politically motivated.").
120. See Former Qwest CEO Nacchio Gets 6 Years in Prison, SEATTLE TIMES (July
27, 2007 4:47 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/former-qwest-ceo-nacchio-
gets-6-years-in-prison/.
121. Dionne Searcy, Former Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio: Tales From a White-Collar
Prison Sentence, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1000142405270230398390457909317379771278.
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been sentenced to prison for 30 years as a result of a trial and appellate
process that were heavily freighted with errors and failings," including
ineffective assistance of counsel. 1
22
D. Questionable Criminality
Even focusing on neutralizations used by individuals to justify
misconduct assumes that the person realizes-at least on some level, if
not consciously-that his actions are criminal. But some white-collar
criminals may not comprehend that their actions are illegal, even if they
might somehow be viewed as wrongful. This is not a neutralization
employed to justify misconduct by claiming that the person was
convinced that it was not harmful or the conduct was justified by other
considerations. Instead, it is a rational conclusion that the conduct came
within the bounds of the law and did not approach the line between
permissible and illicit actions that might call for a rationalization to
explain the reason for what took place. It is not a situation in which
someone ignores warning signs that they are about to cross over into
illegality, because the conduct is clearly wrongful. In other words, the
defendant is not deluding himself that an illegal act "really" is not all that
bad, but instead has reached a reasonable, if later shown to be flawed,
conclusion that the conduct does not violate the law.
A frequent assumption in the literature about how white-collar
defendants explain the reasons for engaging in misconduct is that they
must know, somewhere deep in their hearts, that their actions were
criminal, so that proclamations of innocence are a product of the
neutralizations used to maintain one's self-image. But what if there is a
small subset of perpetrators who can plausibly-even if mistakenly in the
eyes of the factfinder--claim they did not know the conduct was illegal?
The source of this understanding could come from laws that can be
construed so broadly, or the rules governing transactions are so general,
that conduct not previously thought to be illegal turns out to be the basis
for a criminal conviction.1 23 In addition, many violations are subject to
civil sanctions along with criminal prosecution, and it may be that an
area of the law traditionally enforced by regulatory agencies has shifted
122. Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at
35, Farkas v. United States (E.D. Va. 2013), (No. 1:10-cr-00200) (emphasis added).
123. See Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling's Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization
Without Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REv. 459, 466 (2010) (noting that a claim by white-
collar defendants that the conduct was legal "is particularly plausible in cases involving
the interpretation of complex accounting rules or risky business decisions").
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over to criminal prosecution, an unexpected change in how the law is
applied.
24
Many white-collar offenses do not provoke the type of moral
opprobrium attached to a crime like murder or assault, so individuals
may not comprehend how their conduct can be viewed as criminal or
subject them to a conviction rather than, at most, a civil penalty. 25 And
when the violation revolves around the application of technical rules, one
can readily see how a defendant might reasonably conclude that there
was no criminal conduct involved. This is more than just not knowing
the law, because the person may have a reasonable view of what comes
within the scope of the law, which may subsequently change because of
a new enforcement initiative or a broader interpretation of regulations
that can subject a violator to criminal sanctions in addition to a civil
penalty.
Consider the prosecution of Prabhat Goyal, the former chief financial
officer of Network Associates, Inc., for directing how the company
accounted for sales to its largest customer that purportedly inflated its
revenue at the end of fiscal quarters. 26 The case revolved around
whether using "sell-in" accounting for software sales, which allows
recognition of revenue at an earlier point in time, constituted fraud when
"sell-through" accounting allowed recognizing revenue at a later point
that did not require a company to incorporate estimates of future rebates
to customers for unsold products. 127
124. For example, a violation of the federal securities laws, including the rules adopted
by the SEC, can be the subject of a criminal prosecution if the government can show the
defendant acted "willfully." See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West 2014) ("Any person who
willfully violates any provision of this chapter... or any rule or regulation thereunder the
violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required ... ").
125. See GREEN, supra note 25, at I ("What is interesting and distinctive about white
collar crime is that, in a surprisingly large number of cases, there is genuine doubt as to
whether what the defendant was alleged to have done was in fact morally wrong.").
126. United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 913 (9th Cir. 2010).
127. The Ninth Circuit explained the accounting issue this way:
The government maintained that NAI violated GAAP by using "sell-in" accounting
to recognize revenue from these deals earlier than it should have and thereby
overstated its revenue. Under sell-in accounting, a manufacturer like NAI
recognizes revenue when it ships products to its distributors (i.e., "sells in" to the
distribution channel). The manufacturer must estimate the amount of future
rebates, discounts or returns and then reduce its stated revenue by this amount.
By contrast, a company using "sell-through" accounting recognizes revenue when
its distributors sell the product to a reseller (i.e., "sells through" the distribution
channel). Sell-through accounting recognizes revenue later than sell-in accounting
does and nets out rebates, discounts, and returns. Thus the manufacturer does not
need to estimate their effect on its revenue.
Id. at 914 (9th Cir. 2010).
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A "jury convicted Goyal of one count of securities fraud and seven
counts of making false filings with the SEC, 128 even though the "sell-in"
method did not violate the accounting rules. 129 In overturning the
convictions, the Ninth Circuit found a number of problems with the
prosecution, including a lack of any evidence of a fraudulent intent:
"Goyal's desire to meet NAI's revenue targets, and his knowledge of and
participation in deals to help make that happen, is simply evidence of
Goyal's doing his job diligently."' 130 This was the rare case in which the
government's evidence was so insufficient that no reasonable juror could
convict the defendant. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski
went a step further in assailing the government's prosecution as "just one
of a string of recent cases in which courts have found that federal
prosecutors overreached by trying to stretch criminal law beyond its
proper bounds." 131 He concluded:
The government shouldn't have brought charges unless it had clear
evidence of wrongdoing, and the trial judge should have dismissed
the case when the prosecution rested and it was clear the evidence
could not support a conviction. Although we now vindicate Mr.
Goyal, much damage has been done. One can only hope that he and
his family will recover from the ordeal. And, perhaps, that the
government will be more cautious in the future.
132
The prosecution of Goyal rested on the application of imprecise
accounting principles to ordinary business transactions in an effort to
prove a criminal violation that required proof of knowledge of
wrongdoing and an intent to defraud. It is an understatement to say there
are gray areas in those principles, and using them to the benefit of one's
employer can be considered the conduct of a good employee, not a
criminal. It is unlikely that Goyal viewed his conduct as coming close to
the line of a criminal violation, even if the accounting treatment was
aggressive under the rules. Someone in his position who interprets the
applicable rules and principles in a way that permits a rational conclusion
that the conduct is not illegal, even if it comes close to the line, would
not be deterred by a sentence given to another defendant for the same
conduct-except perhaps if it involved the same underlying transactions
128. Id.
129. See id. at 917 ("It is undisputed, however, that future contingencies do not render
sell-in revenue recognition improper if the seller can reasonably estimate the effect of the
contingencies and set aside reserves adequate to cover them.").
130. Id. at 919.
131. Id. at 922 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
132. Id.
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in the same industry, so that the underlying principles changed to make it
clear that the conduct was illegal.
Not every case of evidentiary insufficiency means the defendant did
not know-or at least had any inkling-that he approached the line of
criminality. But for white-collar violations, there can be any number of
situations in which individuals have no conception that what seem to be
ordinary business decisions can subject the person to criminal
prosecution in addition to potential civil liability. So talk of deterrence in
this context is largely meaningless because the very notion requires an
awareness of some risk of engaging in misconduct, which is missing for
the offender who has reached a reasonable conclusion that the conduct is
not criminal.
V. CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE STILL MATTERS
"Imposing a sentence on a fellow human being is a formidable
responsibility. ,133
Just because deterrence does not seem to have an appreciable impact
in reducing the amount of white-collar crime does not necessarily mean
it is unimportant and should be discarded from the process of imposing
punishment. As an initial matter, federal law requires judges to take into
consideration whether the sentence imposed will "afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct," so no court can slight the congressional
mandate. 134 More importantly, deterrence can act as a restraint on judges
who might otherwise consider only the retributivist assessment of
whether a sentence reflects a just desert for a crime. Retribution can be a
two-way ratchet: it can decrease sentences when the crime is not
considered significant and the defendant is an upstanding member of
society, like Ty Warner's tax evasion; or, when the crime causes
significant harm, retribution can have the effect of inflating sentences,
such as the punishment for Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme. Considering
deterrence, however, can temper the retributive impulse by causing
judges to incorporate into the punishment a message to the rest of society
about acceptable conduct.
In the context of contentious legal issues like capital punishment,
gun control, and hate crimes, Professor Kahan argued that deterrence
serves a moderating influence on social discourse by mitigating some of
the emotionalism these topics can provoke from both supporters and
133. Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Sentencing Memorandum and Order at 350, United States v.
Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
134. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (West 2014).
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opponents. 35 While there can be no clear empirical evidence that
punishments have any real deterrent effect to establish which position is
correct, "[t]he idiom of deterrence avoids triggering the injunction
against contentious public moralizing."' 36 He discussed the "cooling
effect" that making reference to deterrence can have by moving the
debate from moral conflict to one of a more dispassionate discussion of
evidence that appears to support (or undermine) one side's position-a
more scientific approach, even if it is devoid of any empirical evidence
to help decide the issue. 1
37
Deterrence serves as a factor in ascertaining what type of punishment
a defendant should receive, but it cannot be the featured player in the
assessment of a penalty.138 So judges should consider whether a sentence
will send a message about what types of conduct should be deterred and
how important deterrence is to the goal of imposing a punishment that
mirrors to some extent the harm inflicted by the conduct and the need to
remove the defendant from society. There is also the issue of whether
white-collar defendants are treated more favorably than those from lower
economic classes and racial minorities because of their typically
unblemished records and charitable and community involvement.'
39
Reference to the deterrent message of a sentence informs the public that
this is conduct that must be prevented and that some measure of
punishment is appropriate, even taking into consideration the positive
attributes and contributions of an individual offender. The probationary
sentence imposed on Ty Warner incorporates a message that deterrence
played no appreciable role in the decision, or at least was sufficiently
devalued that there is no need to look at how others might view the
sentence in assessing the costs and benefits of tax evasion. The Seventh
Circuit's warning that other defendants looking at the case "should take
no comfort in the fact that Warner avoided imprisonment"'' 40 is exactly
opposite of what every white-collar defendant, and their lawyers, will
draw from the punishment. When Bernie Madoff received a 150-year
135. See Kahan, supra note 58.
136. Id. at 446.
137. Id. at 448.
138. See Richman, White Collar Sentencing, supra note 40, at 63 ("Assumptions that
sanctions deter do not necessarily yield a particular sentence or even a sentencing
range.").
139. See id. at 72 ("Devising sentences for well-heeled defendants who have made
undeniable contributions to society even as they have abused the positions of trust and
power they have occupied would be a challenge, even if one put aside the issues of power
allocation and political economy.").
140. United States v. Warner, No. 14-1330, 2015 WL 4153651, at *12 (7th Cir. July
10, 2015).
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prison term, the reference to deterrence was largely meaningless because
giving out a lengthy punishment was largely a reflection of the harm
caused to his victims, with the punishment unlikely to impact anyone
else who might decide to engage in such conduct in the future.
Deterrence should not be the driver of the decision about the
appropriate punishment, but it should not simply be ignored. Judges
should be aware that there is little deterrent impact from a sentence,
especially in cases involving white-collar crimes. Yet they should
understand that consideration of it can provide, along the lines offered by
Professor Kahan, a moderating influence on the discussion of what
constitutes the proper punishment.141 Even if it does not actually deter
other potential defendants, it can deter judges from going to one extreme
or the other in imposing a sentence because it requires consideration of
the impact on society and not solely the particular offender. Thus, one
should not ask whether a particular sentence will deter others from
committing white-collar crimes, because it will not. Instead, ask whether
there is a message in the sentence to society that the court views this
violation as serious enough that it ought to be deterred, and how much
deterrence is appropriate when taking into account the cost of
incarceration and the impact of others, regardless of whether anyone will
actually hear that message.
141. Kahan, supra note 58.
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